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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Hardy'
(decided August 8, 2010)
Joseph Hardy pled guilty to drug possession after the police
seized illegal contraband from his hotel room. 2  This was after the
police, with the assistance of the hotel management, entered the de-
fendant's hotel room and confiscated illegal contraband.3 The police
entry came after the hotel received complaints and the hotel man-
agement personally heard loud noises and smelled marijuana emanat-
ing from the defendant's room. 4  On appeal, Hardy challenged the
search of his hotel room on the grounds that it violated his privacy
rights under the United States and New York Constitutions.s While
the appellate court disagreed with the trial court on the issue of
whether Hardy had standing to contest the seizure, the court nonethe-
less affirmed the trial court's holding because the hotel's justifiable
ejection extinguished Hardy's reasonable expectation of privacy.6
On February 13, 2007, Hardy checked into a hotel room and
paid for one night of accommodations, with the understanding that he
would check out by 11:00 a.m. the next morning.' However, on Feb-
ruary 14, 2007, Hardy neither checked out nor paid for another
' 907 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).
2 Id. at 246- 48. The police officers "seized a bag containing 85 pills of methyleneme-
thamphetamine (MDMA or Ecstasy) and a bag of cocaine, both found in a Kleenex holder in
the bathroom, a small bag of marijuana, found in a pocket of a pair of pants on the floor, and
burnt marijuana cigarettes in an ashtray." Id. at 246. While the defendant pled guilty, he
maintained his right to appeal from the judgment. Id. at 248.
Id. at 246.
4 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
5 Id. at 245. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent
part, that "people . . . [shall] be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." See also N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
6 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
' Id at 246.
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night's stay, "but was nevertheless permitted to stay in his room."
Furthermore, on February 15, 2007, Hardy paid the room charge for
the previous night and the night of February 15, 2007.9 On February
16, 2007, when Hardy again failed to pay or check-out in accordance
with the hotel's policy, the hotel's management called Hardy
throughout the day to ask him for his payment.'o While the hotel's
policy stated that guests "must prepay their room charge by 11:00
a.m. for the following day, ... [hotel management] would let non-
payment 'slide' the first time 'with some guests,' but a second occur-
rence would [require management] to 'take further action.' " "
Throughout Hardy's stay, the hotel manager received com-
plaints from other guests about disturbances from Hardy's room.12
Further, on February 17, 2007, while Kelly Gillespie was conducting
standard security rounds, she personally heard loud noises and
"smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from . . . [Hardy's hotel]
room."l3 Consequently, Gillespie decided to evict Hardy, with the
assistance of law enforcement.14
As the state troopers and Gillespie proceeded to Hardy's
room, they immediately smelled the odor of marijuana which intensi-
fied as they got closer to Hardy's room." After knocking several
times, Hardy eventually opened the door but attempted to close it
when he noticed that law enforcement was outside.16 Once "inside
the doorway" and while the hotel management was instructing Hardy
to leave, one of the state troopers noticed in plain view a black scale
with white powder and a few bundles of money.' 7 Hardy also admit-
ted to smoking marijuana in his hotel room.' 8 Subsequently, the po-
lice seized ecstasy pills, a bag of cocaine, and remnants of smoked
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en to the police station, read his Miranda rights, 20 and agreed to
speak to the police without the presence of an attorney.21
At the end of trial, the judge entertained arguments from both
parties on the issue of standing and Hardy's motion to suppress the
recovered evidence.22 Hardy argued that he retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his hotel room because the rental period had
not expired by the time the state troopers entered and seized the con-
traband.23 While Hardy had not yet paid for his February 16th hotel
night, he thought he could maintain the same payment arrangement
which allowed him to "pay for the previous night on the following
morning." 24 As further evidence that the hotel did not have a strict
payment policy, Hardy's "key card was not deactivated" and his ac-
cumulated phone balance had not been paid.25
The prosecution argued that law enforcement's warrantless
search and seizure was reasonable because Hardy extinguished any
reasonable expectation of privacy he possessed in his room when he
did not previously pay for the night.26 Finally, the prosecution as-
serted that because the state troopers were faced with an emergency
situation, a warrant was not required to search Hardy's room."
Agreeing with the People, the trial court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress the evidence.28
On appeal, the court held that Hardy retained a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy because "the evidence clearly established that
the hotel allowed him to continue his occupancy." 29 Despite the ho-
tel's "one-day grace period," the prosecution never presented evi-
dence that Hardy was aware of this policy.30 Furthermore, the hotel
did not take affirmative action to evict Hardy until the early morning
of February 17, 2007.31 The hotel had not deactivated the defen-
20 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
22 id.
23 id
24 Id. Hardy represented himself in his own defense. Id.




29 Id. at 248.
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dant's key card and "took no action until nearly [nineteen] hours after
check-out time, demonstrat[ing to Hardy] that [he was] allow[ed] to
stay the night."3 2 Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that Har-
dy lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room solely
because he previously failed to pay for his stay.33
However, "just as the expiration of the rental period will ex-
tinguish a hotel guest's reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her room, so, too, will a justifiable ejection." 34 Here, the hotel had
"good cause to eject the defendant from his room" due to the noise
complaints and the smell of marijuana emanating from it.35 The
court reasoned that while Hardy had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the room, it was nonetheless extinguished once the hotel
"took the affirmative step of contacting the police for their assistance
in physically evicting the defendant." 36 The hotel "had the authority
to consent to the police entering into the room to evict the defendant
physically." 37 During the eviction, the police observed the drug pa-
raphernalia and controlled substances, "which justified a more exten-
sive search of the room and its contents."3  Accordingly, the defen-
dant lacked standing to challenge the search because he was
justifiably ejected from his hotel room.
Under federal law, "[a] hotel room can clearly be the object of
Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office"40 be-
cause the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "forcible in-
trusions into . . . constitutionally protected areas." 4 1 To claim Fourth
Amendment protection, an individual "must have a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the place searched" and that manifested expecta-
32 id
3 See id at 249.
34 id.
" Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
36 Id.
3 Id. at 250.
38 Id.
3 Id.
40 United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51 (1951) (holding that while a hotel room is protected by the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he law
does not prohibit every entry without a warrant into a hotel room"). See also Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1988) ("[A]n overnight guest may claim protection of the Fourth
Amendment , but one who is merely present with consent of the householder may not.").
41 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301.
542 [Vol. 27
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tion must be one that society deems is reasonable. 42 If the defen-
dant's expectation is misplaced or unreasonable, the guest will not
have Fourth Amendment protection.43
In United States v. Hoffa,44 for example, the United States
Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation
because the defendant had not relied on the security of his hotel
suite. 4 5 During the defendant's bribery trial, the government relied
heavily on the incriminating statements he made in the presence of a
witness. 46 The statements, which occurred in the hotel lobby, the
courthouse, and elsewhere, disclosed the defendant's plan to bribe the
members of the jury in his previous trial.47 The conviction was af-
firmed on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
sole issue of whether the government violated the defendant's consti-
tutional rights by using evidence supplied by a government infor-
mant.48
The defendant argued that "only by violating . .. [his] rights
under the Fourth Amendment" was the government able to hear the
"incriminating statements in the hotel suite." 49 The defendants al-
leged that the witness' "failure to disclose his role as a government
informer vitiated . .. [his] consent" to repeat the statements made in
the hotel room.50 The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not
have a legitimate interest protected by the Constitution when he made
incriminating statements in the hotel room because he "was not rely-
ing on the security of his hotel suite"; rather, he had "misplaced [his]
confidence that [the informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing."5
The Court held that his expectation was not reasonable and that the
police did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 52
42 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 248. See Minnesota, 525 U.S. at 88 (holding that for a defen-
dant to assert Fourth Amendment protection, he or she "must demonstrate that he [or she]
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that the expectation is
reasonable").
4 Hoifa, 385 U.S. at 302.
* Id. at 293.
45 id
' Id. at 295.
47 Id. at 296.
48 Hoifa, 385 U.S. at 299.
49 Id. at 300.
50 Id.
51 Id.
12 Haifa, 385 U.S. at 303.
2011] 543
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While the Fourth Amendment guards against "guileful as well
as by forcible intrusions into [any] constitutionally protected area,"5 3
a hotel guest's Fourth Amendment protection is not unlimited and
may extinguish pursuant to a justifiable exception or termination of
the rental period. 4 Whether the hotel has taken affirmative action to
repossess a guest's hotel room will affect whether a guest retains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her hotel room.55  If the
hotel has taken affirmative action to evict a hotel guest and the rental
period has expired, that guest does not have standing to contest a
search or seizure of the property.56 Once there is a valid ejection, ei-
ther voluntarily by the hotel guest or involuntarily by the hotel man-
agement, control of the hotel room reverts back to hotel management
"and the former occupant ha[s] no continuing right to privacy in the
room."57
In United States v. Dorais," the court of appeals reaffirmed
the settled premise that a "defendant has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a hotel room when the rental period has expired and the
hotel has taken affirmative steps to repossess the room."5 9 In Dorais,
the court held that while the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his hotel room, that expectation expired before the po-
lice entered the room.60 First, the hotel informed the defendant about
the check-out time and reminded him of the policy a few hours before
check-out.6 1 Secondly, while the defendant communicated to the ho-
tel staff that he wanted to stay past the check-out time, that extension
5 Id.
5 United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997). See Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating that "a guest in a hotel room" is not different from a tenant
in a house and "is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures" (citation omitted)).
ss United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
56 See United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the de-
fendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room even though he wanted
to renew his rental agreement).
5 United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 241 F.3d 1124.
s9 241 F.3d at 1128. See Huffiines, 967 F.2d at 318 (holding that the defendant no longer
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy once his rental period expired and the hotel
would not allow the renewal of the rental agreement). But see Kitchens, 114 F.3d at 32
(holding that a hotel guest may retain a reasonable expectation of privacy after checkout if
the hotel has relaxed practices in enforcing the checkout time).
6 See Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1128.
61 Id at 1130.
[Vol. 27544
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had expired before the police entered the hotel room. 62 Thus, the
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that the defendant
lacked standing to challenge the police entry because it occurred after
his rental period had expired.63
A justifiable ejection is similar to a termination of the rental
period, as the guest loses any rights to the room he or she previously
held.6 For example, a defendant retains an expectation of privacy in
his or her hotel room unless that expectation is revoked pursuant to a
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.65 In United States v. Owens,66 the defendant, Merle Ellis
Owens, was convicted of "possessing cocaine with the intent to dis-
tribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)." 67 During Owens' stay,
hotel management observed a high level of calls to the defendant's
room and a lot of traffic coming in and out of the defendant's hotel
room.68 Upon investigation, the security guard enlisted the help of a
police officer who discovered that the car in the defendant's posses-
sion was stolen.6 9 Subsequently, the security guard, also a police of-
ficer, devised a plan to get the defendant out of the room so they
could investigate inside the motel room.70 Despite being told by
Owens not to enter the motel room because his girlfriend was asleep,
the officer nonetheless entered and scanned Owens' room.7n There,
the police officer found evidence of marijuana, "white powder and
drug paraphernalia in plain view."72 While the defendant was still a
guest, the police officers entered his motel room and seized the co-
caine. The prosecution argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
62 id
63 Id
' Haddad, 558 F.2d at 975.
65 United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the defen-
dant's expectation of privacy was not justifiably revoked by the protective exception). The
protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement is "a quick and cursory viewing to
check" for others who may present a security risk." Id (citing United States .v Blake, 484
F.2d 50, 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
6 Id at 146.
67 Id. at 147 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1982)).
61 Id at 148.
69 Owens, 782 F.2d at 148.
70 id
" Id. at 149.
72 id
n Id. at 150.
2011] 545
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police had "exigent circumstances that justified entry of Owens'
room . .. to neutralize the possibility of harm to the police" from the
defendant's girlfriend who was present in the Owens' hotel room.74
On appeal, the defendant argued that he had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his hotel room because, despite his expired
check-out time, he made arrangements with the hotel to stay for a
longer period.7 5  Notification to the contrary was never communi-
cated to the defendant and he remained in the hotel.76 The court of
appeals agreed with the defendant and reversed the district court's
decision based on three factors.77 First, a few days earlier, the defen-
dant was permitted to stay past check-out time and merely "pay for
the additional term of occupancy."78 Second, "it was not the motel's
policy to evict guests who were staying past check-out time for brief
periods." 79  "Third, the defendant had given a large cash deposit,
which may have led him to believe that he was paid up through the
rest of the week."80
Further, the court held that the protective sweep exception
was not applicable to justify law enforcement entering the defen-
dant's room without a warrant.8' The protective sweep exception
permits police officers to enter a defendant's room following an ar-
rest to secure the area. 82 Protective sweeps are only available when
police officers "reasonably perceive an immediate danger to their
safety."8 3 "A protective sweep is not a thorough search . . . [but is]
merely a quick and cursory viewing to check for other persons who
might present a security risk." 84
The court in Owens held that the "instant facts fail to justify
applying the protective sweep exception to the warrant require-
ment"" because after the defendant's arrest, the officers "had re-
74 Owens, 782 F.2d at 149.
7 Id. at 147-48.
76 Id. at 148. Owens testified that he was assured that his deposit and initial payment se-
cured his weekly stay. Id.
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treated to a safe position, from which they were able to watch
Owens' room with no danger to themselves or others."86 Further, the
officer's objective of securing an arrest was not sufficient to justify as
an emergency situation.87
However, a guest may retain a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy even after the termination of his or her rental period if the ho-
tel's "practice or pattern . .. would make that expectation reasona-
ble."" In United States v. Watson,8 9 the court rejected the argument
that the defendant no longer possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his hotel room because he had not paid for his room by the
hotel's deadline. 90 The hotel's lax check-out policy and the defen-
dant's prior payment history gave the defendant a reasonable expec-
tation that the room was still in his possession.91
After its analysis under federal law, the court in Hardy turned
to the New York State law regarding search and seizure. Similar to
federal law, to challenge a search or seizure, the defendant must
"demonstrate that he [or she] possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the hotel room at the time it was searched." 92 However,
due to the "transitory nature of hotel tenancies, mere nonpayment of
rent terminates any reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel
room."9 3 It is commonly understood that individuals who operate ho-
tels or other similar establishments are "interested in maximum pay-
ing occupancy and thus could be expected to promptly clear the room
of a guest who has overstayed so that another guest may be given the
room." 94 Consequently, after the rental period has expired, "society
does not recognize the guest's asserted subjective expectations of
privacy to be reasonable." 95 Thus, a hotel employee may consent to a
search of the room because the control of the room has reverted back
86 Owens, 782 F.2d at 151.
87 Id.
" Kitchens, 114 F.3d at 32 (citing United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (holding that the hotel's lax check-out policy justified defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his hotel room).
89 783 F. Supp. 258.
90 Id. at 263.
91 Id
92 People v. Lerhinan, 455 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1982). See also N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
93 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 248; Lerhinan, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
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to the hotel and the guest no longer has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 96
For example, in People v. Lerhinan,97' the defendant no longer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room because at
the time of the entry, he "was two weeks in arrears on rent which was
payable in advance weekly." 98 There was no previous arrangement
between the guest and the hotel management that extended his stay
without full payment of the room and the hotel manager "had not
seen the defendant for several weeks." 99 When the hotel manager en-
tered the room for the purpose of collecting the rent and the defen-
dant was not there, the hotel manager's intentions of re-renting the
room was justified because the defendant no longer possessed a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room. 100
Further, just as the expiration of a rental period can terminate
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, "so too, will a jus-
tifiable ejection."' 0' In De Wolf v. Ford,10 2 the court held that
[A]n innkeeper should have the right to make and en-
force such reasonable rules as may be designed to pre-
vent immorality, drunkenness, or any form of miscon-
duct that may be offensive to other guests, or that may
bring his inn into disrepute, or that may be radically
inconsistent with the generally recognized properties
of life. 103
While the guest must submit to this rule, a hotel management's entry
must be in good faith and in a manner "consistent with the rights of
the guest."'
Similarly, in People v. Goldstein,"os the appellate division
held that the warrantless search of the defendant's hotel room was not
96 See generally id. at 824 (stating that "a hotel employee may not effectively consent to a
search . .. during the rental period" because the guest has an expectation that is reasonable).
9 Id. at 822.
98 Id. at 823.
9 Lerhinan, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
1 Id.
1o1 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249; De Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 530 (N.Y. 1908).
102 86 N.E. 527.
103 Id at 530.
" See id The court held that the defendants violated the duty owed to the plaintiffs when
the innkeeper entered the guest's room. Id. at 531.
'os 497 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1986).
[Vol. 27548
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justified by "exigent circumstances . . . [that] necessitated an imme-
diate entry into the room." 106 "Warrantless searches are per se unrea-
sonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement is shown to
exist"'07 and the court found no such exception because "the police
had been conducting a stakeout of the hotel" and the "arrest itself oc-
curred in the hallway." 0 8 Finally, the warrantless search was not
"necessary to insure the safety of the arresting officer or to prevent
the destruction or secretion of evidence." 0 9
The case law is clear that while hotel guests have an expecta-
tion of privacy in a hotel room, that privacy right is not absolute and
can be extinguished by mere nonpayment or a justified ejection by
the hotel." 0 The appellate court properly held that Hardy had stand-
ing to challenge the search and seizure because his rental period had
not expired."' Hardy was "one day in arrears on his rental charge
[and] the evidence clearly established that the hotel allowed him to
continue his occupancy."" 2 The hotel's lenient check-out policy, as
evidenced by the Hardy's active keycard, created an exception to the
general rule that nonpayment extinguished his privacy rights." 3
However "[t]he extension and duration of that expectation de-
pend on the facts and circumstances of each case."" 4 Hardy's expec-
tation of privacy terminated when the hotel management took affir-
mative steps to evict him." 5 The complaints from other guests in the
hotel "and the odor of marijuana emanating from the defendant's
room gave the hotel good cause to eject the defendant from his
room."ll 6 Hardy no longer had Fourth Amendment protection be-
" Id. at 728.
107 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1o8 Goldstein, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
'0 Id. See People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724-25 (N.Y. 1983).
"o Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301; Lerihnan, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
" Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
112 Id. at 248.
113 Id. at 247-49.
114 Id. at 249. See Owens, 782 F.2d at 150; Washington v. Davis, 937 P.2d 1110, 1114
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that there is a subjective and objective analysis with respect
to the Fourth Amendment and the facts and circumstances of a case dictate if an individual
retains an expectation of privacy after the rental period has expired); Colorado v. Montoya,
914 P.2d 491, 492-93 (Colo. App. 1995) (holding that based on the court's findings, the de-
fendant lacked standing to challenge the entry to the hotel room).
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cause he no longer had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hotel
room.' 17 Hardy's conduct, "objectively viewed in light of the totality
of circumstances, 'mandates the conclusion that any expectation of
privacy [] was unreasonable.' "' s Essentially, when Hardy engaged
in conduct that raised suspicion by the hotel management, he no
longer possessed Fourth Amendment protection."9 The excessive
noise and Hardy's drug use effectively waived his right to constitu-
tional protection because his behavior was radically inconsistent with
the practices of the hotel. Further, once the hotel management took
affirmative steps to evict Hardy, his "expectation of privacy in the
room was extinguished."l 20 "As a result, control over the room re-
verted back to the hotel, and the hotel then had the authority to con-
sent to the police entering into the room in order to evict the defen-
dant physically."' 2' Thus, Hardy lacked standing to challenge the
search of the room because he was justifiably evicted.122
In conclusion, the court in Hardy held that while a hotel guest
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy, that expectation can be
extinguished due to nonpayment and affirmative action by hotel
management.123 Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances
to first determine if there was an expectation of privacy and if the ex-
pectation is reasonable under the situation.124 Hardy's conduct re-
sulted in a waiver of any reasonable expectation he possessed and the
hotel management acted with good cause to evict him with the assis-
tance of police.125 Further, hotel guests must submit to the rules and
policies set out by a hotel or be subject to eviction by hotel manage-
117 See Minnesota v. Perkins, 588 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Minn. 1999).
118 Id. at 493 (quoting Minnesota v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn. 1979)).
"9 See Perkins, 588, N.W.2d at 493.
120 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249; United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a hotel guest's Fourth Amendment protection is not extinguished until
the hotel takes affirmative steps to repossess the room). Cf Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1128 (hold-
ing that when a hotel has not yet determined if the hotel guests has been evicted, the guest's
Fourth Amendment protection has not been extinguished).
121 Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 250. "During the ... eviction, the police observed in plain
view a scale and white powder on top of an opened suitcase, which justified a more exten-
sive search of the room and its contents." Id.
122 id.
" See id at 249.
124 Id.
125 See Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
550 [Vol. 27
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ment. 126 While the lower court erred in finding that Hardy did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy due to nonpayment, the er-
ror was harmless because that reasonable expectation was voluntarily
waived by the defendant when he engaged in prohibited acts.127 This
rationale is supported by both federal and New York case law.
Whitney Montgomery*
126 See Ford, 86 N.E. at 530.
127 See Hardy, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2012: B.S. in
Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. I wish to gratefully acknowledge the support of
my family and friends throughout my legal education, especially my mother. Special thanks
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5512011]
13
Montgomery: Appellate Division, Third Department: People v. Hardy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/3
